Valence threat model – openstack

Valence is a collection of functionality to ease consuming disaggregated rack resources, compute, storage, and network that are accessible via the DMTF Redfish RESTful API, to launch a cloud and dynamically grow/shrink an OpenStack cloud. Database query languages The Redfish API is implemented, in our case, by Intel Rack Scale Design PodManager. P d database The functionality is exposed to registered users.

Valence is composed of 3 components, a Web-UI, An API + Controller component, and a collection of plugins for OpenStack that shall allow dynamic grow/shrink of an OpenStack cloud.

• A Controller component that makes the appropriate backend calls to the Rack Controller implementation using Redfish REST API calls, authenticates users, manages user quotas, and more

• Connection credentials and address to the Rack Controller,, which controls the rack scale resource pool. Database 101 Connection details could be provided in a config file or obtained and stored from form input data.

• OpenStack Plugins that essentially shall enable an existing cloud, if configured to do so, to acquire and release resources from a disaggregated pool of resources. M power database In particular these plugins will allow OpenStack/nova to add/release compute hosts, OpenStack/ironic to add/release bare metal nodes, and OpenStack/horizon. Data recovery from external hard drive This aspect as it evolves will be covered by a separate security review.

The composed nodes are used to float a cloud using a deployment tool such as Fuel, Kolla, or other. Database join types In the crawl phase, the cloud is static in size/capacity.

The OpenStack plugins will be developed in a future phase to allow dynamic addition and release of nodes into an existing OpenStack cloud and will need logic to first determine that the node is not in use.

Web UI – Design and deployment strategy’ The Web UI application will consist of static pages and dynamic content generated using scripts (React) and making calls to the API by code (such as list of available node flavors, list of composed nodes etc)

• To prevent arbitrary code injection, all user input to be sanitized (length of input, neutralizing scripting content before executing or saving in database, example > converted to > etc). Section 8 database Cross site scripting

• Returning an error message for url paths that are anything but to the application, such as “/” and “../” to prevent access to other resources on the system.

• Network access — prevent man in the middle attacks and snooping by making the application accessible only securely ( HTTPS/TLS, installing certificate). Icd 9 database Using a firewall.

• Protect from denial of service with iptables rules (number of incoming connection requests accepted in some time window, which IP addresses, protocols etc)

• Preventing bad actor access — use of sudo during maintenance operations, removal of unnecessary accounts. Database xampp Shall retain any password policy on other hosts in cloud system for uniformity.

• Have in place a process/mechanism to apply applicable security patches on the host. Database administrator jobs Where security patches become part of the Linux kernel or other software package, they shall be recorded as version dependencies in the code base to prevent regressions.

• Turn off unwanted protocols, ports, Netbios, SMB etc (protects from profiling attacks), that is ICMP — no fodder for port scans, ping sweeps etc

• Database to be accessed only from the IP of the API+Controller server. Data recovery joondalup IP addresses can be spoofed, but as a first step in the right direction is to limit access to the database machine using an IPTable rule that allows access to the same from only limited machines.

Pod-Manager has already undergone security review. Database of genomic variants Use configured credentials to access from the Web UI the Pod-Manager. Database viewer Should the two applications be running on the same machine all the above Host protections apply. H data recovery registration code free download Should they be on a separate servers, we anticipate the machines will be in a private network and adequately protected via firewalls from the public network.

To enable the dynamic grow/shrink of a cloud, we shall be enabling cloud admin only enabled calls into the Valence Restful APIs. Database hardware While the plugins do not affect Valence security, by their inclusion in OpenStack and other cloud solutions, shall affect the attack surfaces therein. Database roles The plugins and client handles shall be covered in a separate security review as they evolve.

• Usage monitoring rules that trigger admin-only approved or automated actions that grow/shrink a cloud, which may make calls for cloud “shrink” that evacuates a host and then power-offs a node, followed by a release node, while for “grow” composes a node of the desired hardware flavor, deploys the required image on the same and finally registers it with the cloud to host cloud workloads.